

ZRÍNYI MIKLÓS NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

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Security Policy of Russia and Reform of the Russian Armed Forces

PhD Resumé

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In the last few years, the Russian Federation (RF) has appeared ever more invigorated on the international scene, demanding – as the legal successor of the dissolved Soviet Union – the restoration of its great power status. Russia – especially after the reign of Peter the Great and Catherine the Second – exercised a significant influence on the fate of Europe and the world as a whole. At the same time, there has always been present a special, unique attitude characterizing only the Russian people. The Russians themselves, including several great personalities, acknowledge this fact as well. It was the poet Fyodor Tyutchev who summarized and also eloquently formulated this special feature of the Russians in his poem written in 1866.

*Умом Россию не понять,
Аршином общим не измерить:
У ней особенная стать –
В Россию можно только верить.*

Russia cannot be understood with the mind alone,
No ordinary yardstick can span her greatness:
She stands alone, unique –
In Russia, one can only believe.

I chose this citation because Vladimir Putin – at that time as president – modified the poem’s last line by saying “In Russia, one must only believe”. He simply transformed the poet’s mystified expression into a hard presidential sentence, in which there was no room for the permissive, uncertain word “can”. By this sentence, Putin wanted (on 12 Oct. 2007) to communicate to the West that it was high time for it to trust Russia and not to look obstinately for the shortfalls in the Russian democracy. It is but natural that the West had a prompt answer: “All right, we believe Russia, but she ought to allow us to measure the Russian democracy with our own yardstick, in accordance with our values. Russia wants the world to accept unreservedly the Russian social system and not to dwell on its legitimacy; at the same time, it reserves the right to criticize other countries’ political system.

RF’s successful history began in 2000, when Putin was elected president. This implies that the success story is to continue and we will see in the future an economically stronger Russia, relying not only on its revenues derived from hydrocarbon export, but on its newly diversified economy; and as a result of the diversification, it will be able to utilize its incomes from the oil and gas export for promoting its economic development and putting an end to its one-sided dependence on hydrocarbon export.

Russia is going to play an ever-greater international role in political and economic field alike. Its world power status will be represented not only by its deterrent nuclear arsenal, but also by its steady economic presence all over the world. It is not accidental that we can very often read in several national security-related documents: Russia is ready to defend everywhere its economic interests.

The Russians are well aware that this statement remains only an empty phrase if the economic interests are not underpinned by appropriate power, i.e. by military strength. Therefore, Russia spends a lot of money on the technical development of its armed forces and on the improvement of the military personnel’s social conditions.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has a budget in 2009 amounting to a sum of 1,502.50 billion rubles (46.66 billion USD). However, this sum is not enough for financing the more than one million-strong military force. The question is: how is it possible to maintain this enormous military force from this very low budget? The explanation is that the defense expenditures pervade the entire federal budget, i.e. also the non-military sectors, where significant financial sources are hidden for defense purposes, which cannot be perceived by outsiders. For example: a large part of the nuclear forces' expenditures is incurred by the Atomic Energy Agency, while the cosmic forces' technical background is financed by the Ministry of Information. This system of cross-financial provision is a residue from the Soviet era, when the whole economy was subordinated to the country's defense.

The Russian military policy has been formulated first of all in the Military Doctrine based on the National Security Concept. The current Military Doctrine was amended in 2000 and 2002. It is the doctrine that contains also the most detailed version of the development and employment of the armed forces.

The defense minister and the chief of general staff have repeatedly confirmed that Russia practically does not envisage the threat of war, but in theory does not exclude it either. They defined the terrorism as the greatest threat, and emphasized that also the American plan to deploy missile defense system in Eastern Central Europe represents a risk. The military leaders seized every occasion to express their concern over the American plan. Should the plan be realized, they held out the prospect – although in a conditional form – to take strong counter-measures. In this regard, Russia declared a moratorium on the CFE Treaty, however, justifying its introduction by the fact that the NATO countries had not ratified yet the resolution taken at the Istanbul summit. It can be considered as a counter-measure also the deployment of short-range Iskander-M (SS-26) operational-tactical missiles to the Kaliningrad Special Territory. (The missile's export variant has only 280km range, but the one produce for the Russian armed forces has a range of 500km.)

The pattern of deployment of the Russian armed forces basically corresponds to the organizational structure and principle applied to the fronts of the Second World War. Later, in early nineties, as a result of the lessons learnt from the TTPs employed during local wars, Russia reorganized the structure of its armed forces by merging the military districts and creating skeleton units. The main organizational principle is to merge the strategic directions and territorial groupings in military districts, which makes it possible for the commanders to conduct standardized, centrally coordinated theoretical instructions, practical trainings and exercises; effectively coordinate combat activities; harmonize the operational and tactical command and control; and provide comprehensive, unified support to troops. Large units and smaller units being in permanent readiness constitute the core of the military districts. These military formations are capable of conducting prompt operations – in peace- and wartime alike – without the activation of the mobilization system.

Russian political and military high leaders are well aware of the necessity to modernize the command structure, but at present, they do not find it appropriate and timely to make radical changes. However, they have made initial step to this effect by creating – as an experiment – a joint, all-arms regional command.

It was Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov who announced in Oct.2008 the modification of the military structure. In order to introduce a more dynamic command and control procedure, the military leadership has created a new organizational structure,

consisting of military districts - operational command - and brigades, instead of the organizational pattern; army – division – regiment.

1. Reasons for choosing this topic:

- Russia has always been exercising a significant impact – especially from the 16th century (Ivan the Fourth 1530-1584) on Europe, and even on the entire world, including our country. The current Russian society is undergoing an important political and economic change that may result in creating a strong stability in the country. The reinvigorated Russia influences the course of events in the region and all over the world not only in political and military, but also in economic field. Altogether, it is going to increasingly influence security in the world and in Europe, including Hungary. I think, it is enough to mention Russia's "energy-weapon", which however, may prove to be a double-edged one, since to the extent Europe needs the Russian hydrocarbons, so much Russia needs the incomes deriving from its exports to Europe. The Russian leadership knows very well that the hydrocarbon fields will be sooner or later exhausted, however before that moment, it wants to effectively exploit and utilized them to develop a stable, prosperous economy, which does not rely unilaterally on energy export.
- I wish to share my experiences accumulated during my service made in the post-Soviet area with those, who are interested in getting more information about Russia. I regret very much that sometimes we can hear and read unfounded, biased news on the Russian events. I am of the opinion that it is indispensable for us – in order to understand the happenings in this continent-sized country – to scrutinize (in an academic manner) the historical background and the present realities of Russia.
- Last but not least, it was my impressions I gained during my earlier studies and official tours in Russia that have significantly contributed to my decision to choose this subject for my dissertation. I hope that my seven-year studies and also my seven-year service I spent in the post-Soviet region, have provided me such a knowledge that may be enough to help understand better and more objectively the Russian military policy.

2. Hypotheses

The basic thesis of my study is that RF'S foreign policy and economic objectives, as well as its military policy and armed forces reform – which help guaranteeing the achievement of these objectives – fundamentally determine the impact of the Russian security policy on the world and Europe, including our country.

Russia has been making its voice heard ever more loudly in the international life, where it behaves and acts as a determinant player. Moscow feels that Russia has already sufficiently strengthened to restore its great power status. As a matter of fact, it has never ceased (even after the Soviet collapse) to be a great power, thanks to its formidable nuclear potential, but today it wants more than that.

Based on its huge hydrocarbon reserves, Moscow evaluates that the time has come to strengthen its positions in the world economy. Therefore, it is firmly resolute to make use of all the possibilities inherent in its energy export, in order to spend a significant part of its incomes on diversifying its economy, increasing industrial production, thus enabling the country to produce the necessary goods also after the energy carriers have been completely exploited.

It spends a part of the energy-related extra profit on modernizing the armed forces and implementing the military reform. In the future, Russia will assert its economic interests everywhere in the world. It will certainly be capable to do so, thanks to its growing economy and modernized army. A strong Russia, which has all the means at its disposal to enforce its interests, may assume a significant role in determining the security of Europe, including that of Hungary.

3. Formulation of the academic problem

If we are to guarantee Hungary's security and its effective contribution to the international security policy, it is very important for us to be well informed about the military endeavors of the East European countries, in particular Russia. Identification and assessment of the security challenges posed by the countries in this region are of the highest importance for decision-makers to get sufficient and confirmed pieces of information, before taking the necessary measures.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, new states have emerged in the East European region. 15 former Soviet member republics have become independent, however, the main player in the area has remained – from the very beginning – Russia, as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. **The establishment of the Russian Federation has raised many security problems in the region.**

During my research I have analyzed the following academic theses:

- The circumstances in which the RF was established;
- RF's history during the last one and a half decade;
- Evolvement of the country's security situation and the development of its international role;
- Economic situation in the country, chances for prosperity and expected Russian influence;
- Structure of the new Military Doctrine and its expected message;
- Impact of the Russian military reform on the structure, probable employment, technical modernization, system of training and replenishment of the Russian armed forces.

4. Aims of research

In analyzing the factors that determine the Russian security policy, I studied RS's history of the nearly one and a half decade, the evolvement of its security situation and the development of its international role.

My research work was primarily aimed at identifying the impacts exercised by Russia's security and military policy on the security of Hungary and Europe as a whole. During my work I analyzed all the relevant changes in Russia that occurred in the last decade. Based on my analyses, I have tried to forecast the probable security risks.

I describe the evolvement of the Russian military policy in the modern era, and its impact on the Russian society and the security of the world and Europe.

I look into the structure and the probable, essential content of the new Russian Military Doctrine being under elaboration. I examine: does Russia want to "find" or portray a concrete enemy; how does it plan to use its armed forces to defend the country; and what are the scientific methods used while elaborating the national security documents?

I analyze the military reform, the currently available armed forces, their possible reorganizations and employment in peace and war, their system of technical modernization, training and replenishment. I throw light on the necessity of reforms by using the lessons learnt by the Russians during their conflict with the Georgian armed forces.

I intend to contribute to elaborating the Hungarian security policy, academically analyzing the international aspects of our security, and to improving the assessment – at theoretical and practical levels – of Hungary's security situation.

5. Methods of research

As a result of studying the relevant documents and literatures, I provide a general survey of the current situation, which may serve as a basis for a better understanding of the Russian security policy.

To this end, I participated in many relevant meetings and consultations, examined those specific security risks that fundamentally affect the Russian security and military policy.

Elaborating this study, I widely used my experiences gained abroad. (I have to mention in this regard, that I did not fail, at that time, to attend in the host country all the possible conferences connected with my research subject.)

6. The study contains four chapters:

In the introduction

- I explain the actuality and importance of the topic;
- I outline RF's national security policy, Military Doctrine and the main elements of the armed forces reform, the place and role of Russia in the world as well as in the process of establishing and developing the European security systems.

Factors determining Russia's security policy

In the first chapter I describe the Russian security policy and the factors that contribute to its elaboration. In order to help understand the Russian attitude, I go back to the country's past history, later I display Russia's history in the last one and a half decade and the new armed forces set up after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Russia's security policy

I survey Russia's social system, its most important security documents and summarize the Russian National Security Strategy and the federal foreign policy. I look into the planning process of the national security documents and assess the Russian security situation with the help of the "SWOT" method. Last, I analyze the structure of the Russian national security services and their expected development.

Russia's military policy

I expose the principal elements of the Russian military policy; try to identify the probable contents and messages of the new Military Doctrine under still elaboration. With a view to demonstrating the practical realization of the Russian military policy, I survey the Russian-NATO relations, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Military reform in Russia

In this chapter I expose the main strategic groupings of the armed forces, the army and other services. I outline the tasks of the armed forces and the expected programs for their reorganization and modernization. I provide numerical data on the strategic nuclear forces, with reference to their possible development. I characterize the Russian military participation in peacekeeping missions, by drawing up a general picture of the international role assumed by the Russian engineering troops.

I give a thorough examination to the Russian-Georgian conflict and the mistakes committed by Russians during the combat, and disclose the reasons for these mistakes. In addition, I try to identify the methods the Russians use to rectify these mistakes. I characterize the military educational institutions for professional soldiers and their training system. I provide a survey of the 2009 expenditures of the RF's MoD.

In the concluding part, I formulate my summarized conclusions and academic results; furthermore I make recommendations for the utilization of my dissertation.

7. Summarized conclusions

The RF has undergone quite a significant social, political, economic and security political transformation during the last one and a half decade. The initial uncertain social and political situation, as well as the inherited economic problems drifted the post-Soviet

countries, including Russia, nearly to the brink of catastrophe. This happened to the armed forces as well, which represented a high risk for international security, due to the demoralized troops and the uncertain guard and protection of the equipment in Orbat at the nuclear strike forces. Although the military leadership kept repeating that these forces and their weapons were under a strict and permanent control, everybody knew that the dispirited officers were ready to do everything to give food to their starving family.

The political leadership practically left the military personnel alone and stranded. The professional soldiers did not get their salary for several months, and received only some payments in kind (i.e. Tommy), which were enough only to provisionally tide over the hard times. Under these circumstances, there emerged a rampant corruption also in the armed forces and the humiliating harassments became insupportable among simple soldiers.

In this volatile situation, the greatest national security danger to Russia was represented by the wars in Chechnya. There was a strong fear that the collapse of the Soviet Union would be followed by the fragmentation of the RF (which was formed on the basis of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic). At last, Russia was able to avoid the complete collapse, without significant loss of prestige and human sacrifice (which was a completely new phenomenon, because the human lives have never been too important during Russia's history).

The troubled internal political situation induced the nouveau riche and the oligarchs to bring their financial reserves abroad (got sometimes through illegal activities). This plunged the country into a more dangerous crisis. A similar capital export is still going on. The majority of these financial resources are invested in European businesses or real estates. The year of 2005 represented a turning point, a real watershed in the Russian upswing, when the value of foreign investments in Russia (50 billion USD) exceeded the sum of money brought abroad.

The Russian economic stabilization and development started when Putin came to power. The new president stabilized his power (and the economy) relying on two pillars. The first was constituted by those ex-KGB friends and colleagues who were unconditionally loyal to him and clever enough to occupy key state positions. The second pillar was the country's hydrocarbon export, or more exactly, the huge extra profit gained from the high gas and oil prices, which helped Russia to pay back its debts and develop its economy.

Planning the federal budget, the government calculated with an average oil price of the last ten years, i.e. 27 USD per barrel. The sums deriving from higher prices (than 27 USD) get into the Stabilization Fund. In 2007 this extra sum totaled up to 3,539.7 billion rubles (100 billion euros). Despite the expected decrease in oil prices, the value of the Stabilization Fund in 2010 will probably rise to 5,500 billion rubles. According to Russian concept, the extra profits (from the sale of oil) have to be put aside and saved for rainy days, when the oil prices fall and the extra income has ceased to feed the Stabilization Fund. In that case, it will be the fund itself that ensures – hopefully only for a transitional period – the economic growth.

With a consolidated economic situation, the military budget could increase, however the 47 billion USD budgetary appropriations are not enough to finance the more than one million-strong military force.

It would be a big mistake if somebody were to estimate the combat capability of the armed forces by analyzing only the military budget. Although the military equipment is rather outdated, it is still mostly operational. If the regiment and battalion-level rearmament continues, there will be a significant technical development in the next ten years.

The higher financial resources have made it possible to increase the number of contracted soldiers. The increase of their proportion ensures a higher level of combat readiness. Political and military leaders are not willing to give up completely the enlisted system, because they want to guarantee with these soldiers the continuous maintenance of the reservist pool.

After the county came out of the crisis in 2000, it was timely for the military leadership to elaborate – on the basis of the national security concept – the new Military Doctrine, which was amended in 2002. It is practically the Military Doctrine that determines Russia's military policy.

The defense minister and the chief of the general staff have declared on many forums that Russia does not calculate with any large war, but does not exclude its possibility either. According to them, the main threat is posed by terrorism. As regards the American plan to deploy missile defense system in East-Central Europe, Russia will take counter-measures by stationing Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin have announced on a number of occasions that if the United States does not deploy missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia also will give up its intention to station operational missiles in Kaliningrad.

Experts define three types of threat that may affect Russia: they may come from inside, from outside or from “near abroad”. In the prevention or elimination of these threats the armed forces can be – in some way – involved.

In accordance with the leaked part of the security conception being currently under elaboration, the political and military leadership takes into account the new, the most dangerous global military challenges; such as international terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, ethical and religious radicalism, organized crime and drug trade.

It constitutes an important new element in the Russian National Security Strategy that Russia is resolute to defend its economic interests anywhere in the world, and to this effect, the armed forces have to be ready to perform their duties.

The modification of the command structure is a pressing issue, but the military leaders, at the moment, find it that the time has not come yet to make significant changes. They have made only one step to this effect: they set up – by way of experiment – a joint regional command named; Eastern Regional Command, which practically is not completely new, since there were similar headquarters in the past as well. This pattern of strategic command is aimed at separating the administrative management (military districts) from the operational command and control (operational command). This essentially means that the military districts are responsible for mobilization, training and equipment, while the operational command is obliged to plan and lead the operations. I expect the structure of the strategic command to be modified in the sort term.

The principal features of the military reform are: new strategic structure; transition to contracted personnel; putting new weaponry and GLONASS in Orbat; development of munitions-storage, space bases and cosmodromes; redeployment of the Black Sea Fleet to Russian territory; and improvement of social provisions for military personnel.

The complete reorganization of the armed forces is not in the offing yet. A future structure conceived by Army General Baluyevsky – consisting of Nuclear Forces Headquarters, Air-Cosmic Defense Headquarters, Transport Headquarters, “West” Headquarters, “South” Headquarters, “East” Headquarters – would represent a very paradigm shift. I don’t exclude the possibility of such a shift in the future.

According to Defense Minister Serdyukov, the new program for redrawing the military profile will ensure for the commanders to facilitate and step up the flow of orders. Due to the shorter period of time between giving orders and execute them, the military leaders will reorganize the structure of the armed forces: creating military districts – operational command – brigade structure, instead of the organizational pattern: military districts – army – division – regiment. Many experts are against the eliminations of the divisions, since they constitute such military formations that have sufficiently large and effective logistical support. By contrast, although the brigade can be more effective and can operate more independently than the regiment, it is not provided with appropriate logistical support for a larger operation. In support of these experts, even a number of Duma deputies reject the Serdyukov program. 58 deputies have already submitted a petition to President Medvedev to demand the removal of Serdyukov. Also the Defense Commission of the Federal Council addressed a letter to the President demanding the revision of the defense minister’s reform program.

The principal message of the National Security Strategy is to guarantee the security of all the states belonging to the federal system, and reach the restoration of Russia’s great power status. There are several indications that Russia has lost ground during the last years in the world policy and in the region; enough mentioning the revolutionary changes in some member republics and their efforts to try to secede or change their social system.

One of the priority objectives in the military reform is the transition to contracted personnel. It is the contractees who would form the basis of permanent readiness troops. In that way, the units of these troops could be constantly available and ready to be deployed without any previous “forging together”-preparation.

Professional officers are prepared in high military educational institutions subordinated to the MoD. These institutions practically were inherited from the Soviet Army. The Soviet curriculum is updated only to a minimum extent and based on former training programs. For this reason, the Serdyukov reform would severely affect also the military education system. He plans to close up further institutions and merge several schools. However, a drastic reduction of these institutions may bring about an unfavorable situation, in which many officers and professors – who have accumulated enormous practical and theoretical experiences during the last decades – would be dismissed and thus incapable to deliver their knowledge to younger generations. This can even lead, in the long term, to a decreased combat capability.

According to experts, in addition to developing technical capabilities, it is very important for soldiers to have up-to-date personal equipment and get through a high-level education and training. For example, today there is no need for training every year 1500 tank-

officers; it is enough to have only 150, but they must be well trained. While reducing the number of the highest military schools, great attention ought to be devoted also to the retention of seasoned military instructors and teachers having valuable experiences and several academic degrees.

For the troops to have effective combat capabilities and the least possible attrition during the fight, it is imperative for the military leadership to provide them with modern technical means and weapons by producing or acquiring them. Such acquisitions make it possible for experts to take over the relevant technologies and reproduce sophisticated devices. It may be a similar solution the purchase of an Israeli UAV for which the contract has already been concluded.

The Russian armed forces have no professional non commissioned officers (NCOs). The new ministerial program plans to set up NCO personnel by eliminating the current ensign rank and basing on the ensigns, set up a professional NCO category. With the ensigns becoming professional soldiers, a new financial problem arises; the new NGOs become entitled to get service flat, higher salary etc. Today, 120,000 professional soldiers have not got yet service flat. The appearance of NGOs represents new housing demands and problems, which may lead to further tension among professional soldiers.

The military leaders attach great hopes to the one-year obligatory military service. However, the reduction of the service time to one year does not solve the specific problems, such as the too short time to learn handling modern weapons or to put an end to humiliating harassment among enlisted men.

The armed forces can count on some 20 million trained reservists. The political and military leadership does not want to give up training reservists, since if the MoD were to shift to a completely professional military force, the number of reservists would gradually decrease and sooner or later dwindle to zero. It is for this reason that the MoD deems it necessary to maintain the conscript system in a proportion of 25 percent.

Young men enlisted for one-year service get a short (3-4 months) basic training, then go to the military districts' training centers, and after three months and a half, they are promoted to sergeants and sent to some troop as squad commanders or deputy platoon commanders. If we look at this training process, we can notice that these sergeants arrive at the units without any significant practical or theoretical experience to command soldiers of the same age. This is – among others – the reason for many out of order events and scandals. The fledgling sergeants are incapable to keep order among problematic soldiers.

It has always been a returning question for Russia to determine the optimum number of soldiers. However, when this question is raised, it has always meant a cut in the troops. Many experts think that it would be sufficient for the country to maintain only a smaller, 150,000 – 200,000-strong military force. However, such a low number of soldiers are not acceptable to higher political and military leaders, in view of the country's security requirements, its role and commitments in preserving international security. In their opinion, these tasks make it imperative for Russia to have at least one million soldiers at its disposal. With a smaller army the country would fail to perform its main function in military fields.

According to the well-known, influential scientist Alexei Arbatov (Director of the National Security Center at the Russian Academy of Sciences), Russia would need 600,000-

800,000-strong armed forces. His calculation is that Russia must be prepared to wage a local or regional war, which requires only 100,000 troops. Should there be two simultaneous conflicts (in the Caucasus and Central Asia), this number has to amount to 200,000. A well-equipped military force – with the several services and branches – totaling up to 600,000 troops would be able of guaranteeing the country's security.

Another open issue is: professional or enlisted armed forces? Experts opt for a professional force, but they find it necessary to continue reservist training as well.

According to Russia, one of the most important security issues is the American plan to deploy missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Moscow has clearly declared that it considers this deployment as a hostile step. However, while protesting, the Russian political leadership fails or purposefully ignores to take into account one important fact: it was Russia itself to inspire the American step by putting in Orbat the Topol-M ICBMs, which posed to Washington such a threat that required some counter-measures. In support of the American reaction, it has to be underlined that the Topol-M and its naval variant the Bulava delivers such warheads that have a chaotic, random, unpredictable hypersonic trajectory, and for this reason, these missiles are difficult to intercept or destroy with the currently available air defense systems. The only way to destroy them is to shoot them in their boosting phase (when the missile has also extremely high speed, but their trajectory can be still calculated). However, this can be done only if the counter-missiles are deployed very close to the Topol launching site, so as to hit the missile during its boosting phase.

8. New academic results

Based on my assessments, and in accordance with my objectives described above, I achieved the following academic results:

I proved that Russia – with its strengthened economy and modernized armed forces – would assert its economic interests all over the world. A Russia, which is capable to enforce ever more effectively its interests, can assume a significant role in shaping the global and European (including the Hungarian) security environment.

Analyzing and displaying the debates, conceptions and planning methods emerged within the Russian security political circles, I have drawn such conclusions that project the expected planning process aimed at updating the Russian National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine, as well as Russia's probable activities in the fields of foreign- and security policy.

I recommend my conclusions to all those who are responsible for elaborating or accomplishing the theoretical and practical tasks of the international security policy. I hope that my conclusions will be useful, because I have drawn them from my analyses on the reform of the RS's armed forces, their organizational structure, possible employment, financial resources and their participation in several conflicts in the last few years.

I analyzed the possible increase in the capability of the Russian armed forces – on the basis of the experiences gained by Russia during its conflict with Georgia – and I have come to the conclusion that the structural and technical modernization of the armed forces paves the way for Russia to provide efficient military support to enforcing its interests.

9. Utilizations of the dissertation

The scrutinized and assessed problems, as well as the conclusions can certainly prove to be useful for those experts and researchers who deal with Russia and its security policy-related ambitions.

The dissertation can be utilized also during the instruction and training pursued at the Zrínyi Miklós National Defense University. It may serve as an information base for professors, officers, students and researchers.

The illustrations and tables I prepared can assist researchers and lecturers in their work, with regard to the Russian security policy issues.

The conclusions drawn from my personal experiences enable the planners and decision-makers to relay on new academic results – when they identify the risks with the help of doctrinal documents and the actions taken by Russia in the field of internal, foreign and military policy – in order to make recommendations for taking appropriate counter-measures against these risks.